Chockie Group International, Inc.

INSERVICE
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Lessons Learned From the Application and Refinement of Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Programs

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Overview

- Many initial assumptions used to establish the inservice inspections rules and requirements have been found to be incorrect
- As experience has been gained and "lessons learned" the ISI programs have been modified
- RI-ISI process takes advantage of PRA data, industry and plant experiences, & information on specific damage mechanisms

NRC Inspection Requirements

- ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection Programs mandated by US Federal Regulation 10 CFR 50.55a
  - Class 1, 2, & 3 components
  - Rules may be used on non-Code components
- Augmented Programs
  - Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC)
  - Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC)
  - Microbiologically Induced Corrosion (MIC)

ASME Inspection Requirements

- ASME Code required inspection of
  - 100% of B-F Class 1 welds
  - 25% of B-J Class 1 welds
  - 7 ½% of Class 2 welds
- Welds selected based on “high stress/high fatigue” locations
- These ISI requirements are significant changes from those originally envisioned

Need for ISI Standards
The Early Years

- Initial rules and regulations for nuclear plant inspections based on fossil plants
- SSCs were over-designed, over built, & over maintained
- Originally little consistency in ISI programs

Need for ISI Standards
The Early Years

- AEC study set the basis for ISI program requirements
  - Inspection of important systems and components
  - 10 years to complete all inspections
  - Random-failure philosophy
  - Preservice exams
  - No rules or guidance when indications are found

Random-Failure Philosophy

- Operational experience showed service-induced failures were not due to
  - random causes
  - at random times
  - at random locations
- Failures were from high stresses, fatigue, incorrect materials, and operational errors
- many could have been predicted with proper analysis or material selection criteria

Changes to ISI Requirements

- Initial Section XI Code revised
  - Targeted high stress areas
  - Addressed high cumulative usage factors (fatigue)
  - Incorporated requirements for
    - UT criteria
    - flaw acceptance standards
    - fracture mechanics analysis
    - repair and replacement rules
    - other piping & components in Class 2 & 3 systems
- Current ISI requirements set in 1978

Lack of Effectiveness of ISI Programs

- Data began to show that inspections often focused on the wrong SSCs
- The appropriate locations were not being inspected
- The correct type of exams were not being performed

Basis for RI-ISI Programs

- Key actions leading to current RI-ISI programs
  - WASH-1400 (1975) – *a major step in risk quantification*
  - Three Mile Island accident (1979) – *a catalyst for required use of risk analysis and risk insights*
  - ASME Research Committee on Risk Technology (1988) – *developed risk-informed inservice inspection (RI-ISI) methodologies*

Approval to Risk-Inform ISI Programs

- ASME Section XI RI-ISI Code Cases
  - N-560 – Alternative exam requirements in Class 1 B-J Piping Welds
  - N-577 – WOG RI-ISI Methodology
  - N-578 – EPRI RI-ISI Methodology
- WOG & EPRI Topical Reports
- NRC did not endorse Code Cases but did endorse Topical Reports – allowing plants to obtain approval to risk-inform their ISI program

RI-ISI Lessons

- > 85% US plants have implemented RI-ISI programs – many are already in the process of updating their RI-ISI program
- Examples of lessons learned
  - the use of experts
  - consistency of applications and reviews
  - effectiveness improvements

The Use of Experts

- An essential part of the risk-informed methodology is the combination of qualitative insights and guidance with the quantitative results of probabilistic analyses
- Based on pilot plant applications and NRC guidance
  - WOG revised the expert panels to support the more quantitative nature of the WOG methodology and review all steps of the risk-informed process
  - EPRI revised the experts' role to support the simpler, process driven EPRI methodology and not be overly dependent on subjective judgments

Consistency of Applications & Reviews
The Submittal Template

- NRC & industry agreed on the need for a standard application submittal template
  - to make the RI-ISI program development and regulatory review more efficient and consistent
  - To ensure the licensees provide appropriate information in the correct format to the NRC
  - Requires information on
    - qualification to perform the analysis
    - process used to perform the analysis
    - results of the analysis – proposed changes
- The template has, & will continue, to evolve

Effectiveness Improvements

- Non-mandatory Appendix R was developed to address NRC concerns with original RI-ISI Code Cases
  - incorporated details found in the Topical Reports.
  - items that the NRC identified as being missing in the Code Cases were included
  - concerns and questions by licensees regarding the original Code Cases were addressed

Effectiveness Improvements

- Code Case N-716 – risk insights are used to define alternative requirements for ISI
  - builds upon lessons learned
  - establishes a generic set of requirements, such as classification and examinations to reduce RI-ISI program development effort
  - potentially eliminates many low value added exams

Concluding Remarks

- RI-ISI methodologies have and continue to be refined as "lessons are learned"
  - Involves industry and NRC working together
  - Plant RI-ISI programs are "living programs" and also need to incorporate lessons learned
- Success of the RI ISI piping applications has lead to expansion of risk-informed methods into other areas
- Need to keep it simple while addressing basic risk-informed principles

- continued to refine and expand the use of risk-informed methodology
- major reductions in inspections, radiation exposure, and associated costs due to the implementation of the RI-ISI methodologies.
- The NRC has encouraged the appropriate use of the risk-informed approach

Concluding Remarks

- RI-ISI
  - Provides a structured and systematic framework for allocating inspection resources in a cost-effective manner and focus inspections where failure mechanisms are likely to be present and enhanced inspections are warranted
  - Considered to be highly successful by both industry and regulator
  - Plants have realized major reductions in inspections, radiation exposure, and associated costs
  - NRC encourages RI-ISI continued refinement and application – *to allocate inspection resources in a cost-effective manner and help focus inspections where failure mechanisms are likely to be present and enhanced inspections are warranted*

Future Directions

- NRC risk informed initiatives, including new directions for RI safety classification
  - 10 CFR 50.69, *Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of SSCs (Option2)*
    - Uses risk-informed safety classification to determine the applicability of special treatment requirements
    - Treatment includes quality assurance, testing, inspection, condition monitoring, assessment, evaluation, and resolution of deviations

Lack of Effectiveness of ISI Programs

- Section XI Task Group on ISI Optimization found
  - only 156 of 37,332 B-J welds contained flaws
  - 97% of the 156 flawed welds due to IGSCC
  - 0.6% of the welds inspected following ASME Section XI examination procedures contained flaws
  - almost all flaws detected by IGSCC Augmented Program

What Were the Plants Telling Us?

- Inservice failures (cracks, leaks, or breaks) were found to be caused by
  - Flow Sensitive Attack (FAC, Erosion/Cavitation)
  - Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC, TGSCC, PWSCC, ECSCC)
  - Vibration Fatigue
  - Localized Corrosion (MIC, Pitting, Crevice Corrosion)
  - Thermal Fatigue (Thermal Transient, TASCS)

Piping Failures 1970-2007

Appendix R

- Differences from original Code Cases
  - Piping exempt from examination
  - Clarification of the Duties of the Inspector
  - Applicability of pre-service examinations
  - Requirement to perform any required additional examinations during the current outage
  - An update to the 2500-1 Table requirements for examinations to reflect the experience from implementation of the Code Cases

Basis for Risk-Informed

- All nuclear power plants were required by the NRC Generic Letter 88-20 to perform an Individual Plant Examination (Probabilistic Safety Analysis)
- Plants were to determine plant vulnerabilities to:
  - Core Damage Frequency (CDF)
  - Large Early Release Frequency (LERF)
- CDF and LERF can be used to determine an optimum inservice inspection scheme

Risk

$$\textit{Risk} = \textit{probability of event} \times \textit{its effects}$$

Probability of event – a function of potential degradation modes as determined by physical characteristics and operational parameters

Effects – measured by CDF and LERF

EPRI Methodology Overview



WOG Methodology Overview